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DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AS A
PREENFORCEMENT REMEDY AGAINST
INVALID FDA REGULATIONS
by ANTHONY S. ZITO, JR.*
A food, drug, or cosmetics manufacturer subject to an
administrative regulation which it honestly considers to be
invalid traditionally has been confronted with a cruel dilemma.
It could either comply with the regulation despite the fact that
it was believed to be invalid, or disobey it deliberately and
attempt to set up the invalidity of the regulation as a defense
to any threatened civil or criminal enforcement action. If the
latter course was chosen and the court disagreed with the manufacturer's judgment, it was likely that the manufacturer would
find itself in the uncomfortable position of having incurred civil or criminal liability. A third alternative, preenforcement declaratory and injunctive relief, has been used effectively
in a variety of situations, but until recently has been considered
to be inapplicable1 with respect to regulations promulgated pur2
suant to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Beginning with Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,3 however,
a handful of decisions have granted preenforcement declaratory
and injunctive relief against FDA actions. In departing from
an earlier belief that declaratory and injunctive relief was available only in the rare case, 4 two major factors have emerged.
* Associate Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. B.A.,
J.D., L.L.M., Case-Western Reserve University. Member of the Ohio and
Illinois Bars.
1. E.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
2. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. Perhaps a preliminary word is necessary
at the commencement of this study dealing principally with the FDA's
attempt to put into force various amendments which were added to the

Food and Drug Act in 1962. While some may view the outcome of these
attempts as a triumph for the FDA, the coherence of the agency's methods in effectuating the amendments' policies is suspect. Numerous determinations, regulations, and other administrative actions taken in pursuance of those amendments were on an ad hoc basis, were directed toward immediate problems confronting the FDA in administering the
Drug Act, and were certainly not designed to be sensitive to long range
problems of policy development. The unfolding tale which emanated
was one of administrators' attempting to implement legislative directives
with inadequate regulatory tools while numerous pressures, not the least
of which has been by the drug industry, have disrupted the overall FDA
environment.
3. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
4. E.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950)
(court would not interfere with FDA's summary seizure of petitioner's
goods which were potentially hazardous to human health, especially in
view of the fact that the process by which seizure was effected was only
a preliminary step in the administrative procedure).
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The first is procedural in nature, and relates to questions of justiciability of preenforcement judicial review. Here there has been
a marked change in favor of a pragmatic view of justiciability,
utilizing a balance of harms approach. The second factor is substantive in nature and relates to major revisions in the FDC Act
itself. Specifically, the Act was amended in 1962 to incorporate,
inter alia,a specific standard of review-the substantive evidence
rule.
This article will explore the facts ordinarily found necessary
to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief as a preenforcement
remedy within the purview of these developments. In any
suit brought for preenforcement judicial review, recurring facts
have been critical in determining the availability of any preenforcement remedy: (1) the sensitivity of the subject matter,5 both in terms of the inherently harmful effect of unsafe foods and drugs as well as the indirect consequences of
adverse public reaction to food and drug manufacturers;6 (2)
economic harm to the manufacturer; 7 (3) the need for drugs
which are effective as well as available;8 (4) the need to have
the agency develop its own guidelines without judicial interference; 9 (5) the adequacy of alternative remedies, if any, for
manufacturers; 10 (6) the nature of the question presented for
judicial review-one of law or fact."
ELEMENTs OF JusTIcIAILIY

Before a discusssion of the merits of any given action can
be reached, a series of jurisdictional hurdles must be met. These
are the traditional elements of justiciability as adapted to
preenforcement judicial review of FDA actions.
Availability of a Remedy

Much of the inquiry in this area has been made academic
by §§ 701, 702, and 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 1 2 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDC Act) con5. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609
(1973) (prescription drugs); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc., 387 U.S.
167 (1967) (same) ; Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158
(1967) (same); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (same);
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (misbranded
vitamins); Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 363 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mich. 1969) (prescription drugs), aff'd, 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970).
6. See cases cited at note 5 supra.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq.
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tains specific remedial provisions for administrative hearings and
for review in the courts of appeals. These remedies correlate
with regulations issued under certain enumerated provisions of
the APA. 13 The traditional view has been that where an act
specifies a remedy, all other remedies, including preenforcement
14
judicial review, are normally excluded.
5
In the case of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,1
the
Supreme Court overruled the traditional view. The true inquiry, the Court said,
is whether Congress by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic

Act intended to forbid preenforcement review of . . . regula-

tion[s] promulgated by the Commissioner. The question is
framed in terms of prohibition rather than authorization because
. . .judicial review of a final agency action . . .will not be cut

off unless there is a persuasive reason to believe that such was
the purpose of Congress.' 6
The court pointed out further that § 702 of the APA
embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to one 'suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute [here the FDC Act],' 5 U.S.C. § 702, so long as no statute
[again the FDC Act] precludes such relief or the action is not one
committed by law [under the FDC Act] to agency discretion,
5 U.S.C. § 701(a). The Administrative Procedure Act provides
specifically not only for review of '[a]gency action made reviewable by statute' but also for review of 'final agency action for
which there is no adequate remedy in a court,' 5 U.S.C. § 704.17
The Court reviewed the legislative history of the APA and concluded that "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict
access to judicial review."' 8
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.
14. Switchman's Union v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943);
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). In Ewing
v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950), plaintiff sought an
injunction against the FDA to prevent it from proceeding with multiple
seizures of plaintiff's products on the grounds that the manufacturer had
not been given the opportunity to present evidence on the question of
whether there was probable cause for issuance of seizure process. In
denying the relief sought, the Court stated that the
highly selective manner in which Congress has provided for judicial
review reinforces the inference that the only review of the issue of
probable cause which Congress granted was the one provided in the
libel suit [to the effect that no administrative hearing at the preliminary stage is required by due process as long as one is held before
a "final" administrative order became final].
Id. at 600-01.
15. 387 U.S. 136. (1967).
16. Id. at 139-40 (citing Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962); Brownell
v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956); and Board of Governors v.
Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947)).
17. 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
18. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
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The Court next turned its attention to the remedial provisions of the FDC Act to apply the APA exclusion of review test
outlined above. It pointed out that the FDC Act nowhere prohibited remedies other than those enumerated and, in fact, §
701 (f) (6) states, "[t] he remedies provided in this subsection shall
be in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies
provided by law."'19 The Court rejected the government's argument that the inclusion of a specific procedure for review of certain enumerated kinds of regulations20 precluded other types
of preenforcement review on the basis of an examination of the
legislative history of these sections, pointing out that
[a]t the time the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was under
consideration, in the late 1930's, the Administrative Procedure
Act had not yet been enacted, the Declaratory Judgment Act was
of administrative
in its infancy, and the scope of judicial review
21
decisions under the equity power was unclear.
The provisions of § 701(f) quoted above were added to the FDC
Act by "those who feared the life-and-death power given .. .
to the executive officials ...."22
The Court distinguished the Abbott decision from the early
case of Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,28 on the grounds

that the injunction sought in Ewing was based upon the theory
that a hearing had not been held to establish probable cause for
the seizure action therein. The Abbott Court compared the
Administrator's finding of probable cause to the determination
by a grand jury: "[I] t is a finding which only has vitality once
a proceeding is commenced, at which time appropriate challenges
can be made. ' 24 This, the Abbott Court concluded, is substan25
tially different from a case challenging final agency action.
In Upjohn Co. v. Finch,26 the district court opinion found
the Abbott conclusion-that neither the APA nor the FDC Act
precluded preenforcement judicial relief 27-equally applicable
where the question was one of the Administrator's jurisdiction
to promulgate a certain order:
The controversy in this case is not unlike that considered
by the United States Supreme Court in Abbott. As in Abbott
the drug manufacturer (Upjohn) is faced with enforcement of
an agency order before it has an effective opportunity to seek
to have the order reviewed pursuant to the provisions of the
19. 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (6).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e).

21. 387 U.S. 136, 142 (1967).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
339 U.S. 594 (1950).
387 U.S. 136, 147 (1967).
Id. at 148.
303 F. Supp. 241, 249-50 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
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[FDC] Act. As in Abbott there is here a serious question as
to whether the defendants are attempting to exceed the powers
granted by Congress to the substantial detriment of the plaintiff.
. . [T]he
[
instant action is a proper case for judicial review
28
in its present posture.
The Supreme Court's decision in Abbott has obviously done
much to clarify the question of the availability of an injunctive
remedy in those cases where the FDA administrative regulations
are involved. The ease with which the Abbott doctrine was
applied to the facts in Upjohn indicates that the availability issue,
a major problem prior to Abbott, is unlikely to be of significant
concern in the future. Nevertheless, applicable statutory provisions must be scrutinized to make certain that review of specific
action taken has not been precluded by and through the above
APA sections, or by and through a comprehensive reading of the
FDC Act and its legislative history.
Ripeness-Finality
One of the decided departures taken in recent cases dealing
with preenforcement judicial review relates directly to the dual
question of whether the matter presented for review is and was
final agency action within the meaning of the FDC Act, 29 and
is otherwise ripe for review. Ripeness denotes primarily the
status of a controversy which has reached the stage which makes
it appropriate for judicial recognition. The Supreme Court has
substantially clarified its criteria for determining whether a case
involving the availability of injunctive relief as a preenforcement
remedy against administrative regulations is ripe for review.
The Court has stated that two criteria must be met: first, the
issue tendered must be appropriate,8 0 and, second, the hardship
28. 303 F. Supp. 241, 249-50 (1969).
29. Although the FDC Act itself contains no definition of final agency
action or agency action, the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) defines agency action to include "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license,
sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act."
Cases under the FDC Act refer to this definition when the term agency
action arises. See generally note 90 infra.
30. Injunctive relief was granted in Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942). The FCC issued regulations
expressing "the general policy we will follow in exercising our licensing
power" and stated that "no license shall be granted" to any station entering into certain specified types of contracts. Many of the contracts which
Columbia had with stations in its network chain were among the types
proscribed by the regulations. In the opinion, the Court stated that
it is evident that application by the Commission of its regulations
in accordance with their terms would disrupt appellant's broadcasting system and seriously disorganize its business.
Id, at 414. The Court stated that where regulations affect a petitioner's
rights as such, they "have the force of law .... " Id, at 418-19. See
also text accompanying note 37 infra.
Similarly, in Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 137-38 (1967),
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to the parties if judicial relief is denied must be substantial.8 1

Obviously, the criterion of appropriateness for judicial relief,
standing by itself, does not provide a great deal of guidance;
however, by providing a description of the specific factors which
it will consider to determine appropriateness, the Court has substantially clarified this question. These factors are three: the
regulation or order in question must be a final agency action
within the meaning of § 10 of the APA; 3 2 the issue, as it is
framed by the case, must present a purely legal question; and
the regulation or order must be phrased in such a manner that
it immediately affects the day-to-day conduct of the manufacturer.
In addition, courts have found themselves uniquely competent in dealing with cases in which the issue presented for
preenforcement review is in the nature of a question of law. One
such question of law often raised is whether the agency has acted
within its jurisdiction, for courts have been reluctant, except in
the Supreme Court found the controversy to be "ripe" within the following context:
In 1962 Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act . . . to require manufacturers of prescription drugs to print the
'established name' of the drug 'predominantly and in type at least
half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary name or designation for such drug,' on labels and other printed material ....
The 'established name' is one designated by the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare pursuant to § 1502(e) (2) of the Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 352 (e) (2); the 'proprietary name' is usually a trade name under
which a particular drug is marketed. The underlying purpose of the
1962 amendment was to bring to the attention of doctors and patients
the fact that many of the drugs sold under familiar trade names are
actually identical to drugs sold under their 'established' or less familiar trade names at significantly lower prices. The Commissioner
of Food and Drugs, exercisingauthority delegated to him by the Secretary, 22 Fed. Reg. 1051, 25 Fed. Reg. 8625, published proposed regulations designed to implement the statute, 28 Fed. Reg. 1448. After
inviting and considering comments submitted by interested parties
the Commissioner promulgated the following regulation for the 'efficient enforcement' of the Act, § 701 (a), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (a): 'If the
label or labeling of a prescription drug bears a proprietary name
or designation for the drug or any ingredient thereof, the established
name, if such there be, corresponding to such proprietary name or
designation, shall accompany each appearance of such proprietary
name or designation.' 21 CFR § 1.104(g) (1).
(emphasis added).
31. In Abbott the harm alleged was both economic, in terms of the
fact that the costs to relabel all of petitioner's drugs affected by the regulation outlined in note 30 supra would have been enormous, and intangible, due to the tremendous loss of goodwill which the pharmaceutical
firm would incur should it have been found to have been mislabeling
its prescription and other drugs. Since the Abbott case, therefore, the
loss of goodwill has been clearly recognized as a factor going to the question of hardship as it relates to the overall consideration of ripeness. See,
e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mich. 1969), aff'd, 422
F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970) (if preenforcement review was denied, plaintiff
would have had to discontinue sale of many of its drug products or, by
acting in defiance of FDA rulings, risk summary seizure of its drugs and
prosecution).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
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the case of discretion lodged by statute in the administrator, to
allow the agency to determine its own parameters of action.8 3
Another legal question exists where the agency has interpreted a
broad statutory term which fails to follow the exact intention

34
manifested by Congress by a reading of legislative history.

Thus, where an agency has taken a generic term and interpreted
it within the purview of the goals it views as being effected by
the statute, a court may find concreteness in terms of whether
the interpretation is unwarranted. 3
In Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States,36 plaintiff sought review of an FCC regulation which stated that the
Commission would refuse to issue or renew licenses of stations
which entered into certain types of proscribed contracts. At the
time suit was brought for preenforcement relief against the regu-

lation, no licenses had been denied or revoked and the regulation
properly could have been classified as merely a statement of
the Commission's intentions. A preenforcement challenge, however, was allowed:
Such regulations have the force of law before their sanctions are
invoked as well as after. When, as here, they are promulgated
by order of the Commission and the expected conformity to them
causes injury cognizable by a court of equity, they are appropriately the subject of attack. .... 37
Similarly, in Abbott, the Court considered the ripeness of
a suit to enjoin enforcement of an FDA regulation requiring the
use of the generic name 8 of a prescription drug every time the
brand name appeared on the product's label. The industry practice had involved the use of the generic name with the most
33. It is essential for the agency itself to develop its own guidelines
without judicial interference. The issues presented in Upjohn Co. v.
Finch, 303 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mich. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir.
1970), presents the type of situation where a court will not defer to an
initial agency determination. The sole questions presented for preenforcement judicial review in Upjohn were whether the FDA had acted
in excess of its statutory authority and without observance of the procedures required by law in ordering certain of the petitioner's drugs off
the market. These questions primarily concern problems of statutory
construction and, as will be developed later, unless policy determinations
in the form of statutory interpretation are placed within the exclusive
province of an administrator, are the types of questions which courts
traditionally have been competent in dealing with.
34. E.g., NLRB v. Hearst Pubs., Inc., 322U.S. 111 (1944).
35. The generic name of a drug is its common or recognized pharmacological name (such as "Meprobamate"), while the brand name is
the manufacturer's trade or proprietary name (such as "Miltown"). The
FDA regulation in Abbott would have required the manufacturer to indicate the generic name every time the proprietary name was used on certain drugs' labels; whether this regulation was warranted by a reading
of the enabling legislation became the sole question on a review of the
merits of the controversy in the Supreme Court.
36. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
37. Id. at 418-19.
38. See notes 30 and 35 supra.

826

The John Marshall Journalof Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 9:819

prominent appearance of the brand name only. Compliance with
the regulation would have required extensive labeling changes
throughout the industry. The Court found the controversy to
be "ripe" for judicial resolution.
First, the regulation in question was found to be a "final
agency action." 9 Relying upon Columbia Broadcasting,40 Frozen Food Express v. United States, 41 and United States v.
Storer Broadcasting Co., 4 2 the Court found the element of
"finality" to be satisfied.
The regulation challenged here, promulgated in a formal manner
after announcement in the Federal Register and consideration of
comments by interested parties is quite clearly definitive. There
is no hint that this regulation is informal . . ., or only the ruling of a subordinate official . . ., or tentative. It was made
43
effective upon publication, and ... compliance was expected.
Second, the issue presented by the case was found by the
Court to be a purely legal one:
[W]hether the [FDC] statute was properly construed by the
Commissioner to require the established name of 44
the drug to be
used every time the proprietary name is employed.
Since both sides had approached the case as one of congressional
intent, and the Government had made no effort to justify the
regulation in factual terms, the parties themselves had restricted
the case to this legal question.
With regard to the third criterion, the Court found that "the
impact of the regulations upon the petitioners is sufficiently
direct and immediate as to render the issue appropriate for judi-

cial review

. . . . 4

The regulations in question were clear-

cut and were effective immediately upon publication. If denied
judicial relief at this stage, the plaintiff either would have had
to expend vast sums of money to alter its labeling, or risk
both seizure of its products and subsequent prosecution. Finally, for the same reason, the context in which the regulation
faced by the manufacturer was issued should be considered. The
Court found it
relevant ...
to recognize that petitioners deal in a sensitive
industry, in which public confidence in their drug products is
especially important. To require them to challenge these regulations only as a defense to an action brought by the Government
46
might harm them severely and unnecessarily.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
316 U.S. 407 (1942).
351 U.S. 40 (1956).
351 U.S. 192 (1956).
387 U.S. 136, 151 (1967).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
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Further, in Abbott, the Court stated that the injunctive and
declaratory judgment remedies were discretionary, and that
courts traditionally had been reluctant to apply them to administrative decisions unless it could be proved that they had arisen
in a controversy ripe for judicial resolution. 47 The Court stated
that the primary reason for this procedure was to prevent the
courts from excessive entanglements in various abstract arguments over administrative policies, to avoid premature adjudications, and to protect the agencies from interference from the judiciary until the results of the administrative decision could have
an effect upon the manufacturers' day-to-day activities. Justice
Harlan stated quite clearly in his opinion:
[W]e believe the issues presented are appropriate for judicial
resolution at this time. First, all parties agree that the issue
tendered is a purely legal one; whether the statute was properly
construed by the Commissioner to require the established name
of the drug to be used every time the proprietary name is
employed. Both sides moved for summary judgment in the
District Court, and no claim is made here
that further admin48
istrative proceedings are contemplated.
The Court also stated that the regulations in question were
found to be final agency action within the meaning of § 10 of
the APA, 49 as construed in judicial decisions. It should be noted
that in Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc.,50 similar considerations impelled the conclusion that the manufacturer's dilemma
with respect to three color additive regulations there in question
was ripe for judicial review.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 149.
49. 5 U.S.C. § 704. See also for a definition of "agency action" within
the purview of the APA, note 29 supra. Both Frozen Food Express v.
United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956), and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), took a similarly flexible view of finality.
At issue in Frozen Food Express was an ICC order specifying commodities that were deemed to fall within the statutory class of "agricultural
commodities." Vehicles carrying such commodities were exempt from
ICC supervision. An action was brought by a carrier that claimed to
be transporting exempt commodities, but which commodities the ICC
order had not included in its terms. Although the dissenting opinion
noted that this order only had authority to give notice of how the Commission interpreted the Interstate Commerce Act and would have had
effect only if and when a particular action was brought against a particular carrier, and argued further that "judicial intervention [should]
be withheld until administrative action has reached its complete development," 351 U.S. 40, 45 (1956), the majority of the Court held the order
reviewable without particular application. Also, in Storer Broadcasting,
the Court held to be a final agency action within the APA an FCC regulation announcing a Commission policy that no television operating
license would be issued to any applicant already holding five such
licenses, even though no specific application of the policy announcement
was before the Commisison. The Court stated: "The process of rulemaking [by which Storer claimed to be aggrieved] was complete." 351
U.S. 192, 198 (1956).
50. 387 U.S. 167 (1967).
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Thus, modern cases following Abbott have taken the position
that finality, as it relates to ripeness within the context of an
FDA action, ought to be decided upon a pragmatic basis. Where
no more action is required to force some sort of compliance by
a manufacturer and has immediate effects upon the manufacturer, the action should be deemed final.51 As such, the same
considerations which impelled a finding of ripeness in both
Columbia Broadcasting and Abbott surfaced in Upjohn Co. v.
52
Finch.
In Upjohn, the FDA promulgated an order which, thirty days
after publication in the Federal Register, would have automatically revoked prior certification of existing batches of plaintiff's
otherwise widely accepted drug. No stay of the order pending
any administrative hearing was provided for in the order itself.
In addition, it was obvious that no new batches of plaintiff's drug
could be certified, in view of that order. The administration
clearly expected compliance; the thirty day delay, it was argued,
was included merely "to allow time for a recall [of plaintiff's
drug] to be completed."55
The impact of this order upon the
plaintiff was immediate and substantial. Not only would it
suffer loss of revenue during the period the drug was off the
market, but even if it should ultimately prevail in subsequent
administrative hearings or judicial proceedings, the damages
resulting from adverse publicity and loss of physicians' confidence would be immeasurable. As defined in Columbia Broadcasting, 54 the Upjohn order was clearly a final agency action.
A major factor in favor of the manufacturer is whether there
will be immediate economic harm. In the Abbott case, this
would certainly have been true. 55 In Abbott's companion case,
51. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
52. 303 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mich. 1969), affd, 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir.
1970). See also text accompanying note 37 sura.
53. 422 F.2d 944, 963 (6th Cir. 1970).
ee generally note 90 infra.
54. See notes and text accompanying notes 37 and 49 supra.
55. In most of the FDA cases upon which reliance is principally
placed throughout this article, certain generalizations as to economic
arm can be made. In all the cases where preenforcement review was
permitted, vast outlays of money normally seem to have been within
view if full compliance with FDA regulations was made. In Upjohn,
for example, a $30 million dollar business was involved. 422 F.2d 944,
950 (6th Cir. 1970). Loss of confidence in the consuming and professional sectors of society, brought about by adverse publicity of any action
in defiance of the regulations, would certainly have resulted in economic
harm. This was true in the Abbott decision, even though the safety
of the drugs in question there was not an issue. As such it is often impossible to distinguish between actual economic loss and loss of industrywide goodwill; but this should be minimized, for they are inseparable
factors which result in economic harm. Of course, should a manufacturer decide to defy an FDA regulation, not only would there be adverse
publicity, but in addition the manufacturer could risk summary seizure
of its products and thus the loss of a capacity to carry on any business
whatsoever.
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Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc.,56 where the Court also
upheld a lower court's engaging in preenforcement review of
regulations prescribing the use of color additives in certain foods,
drugs, and cosmetics, there would also have been little doubt as
to the extent of economic harm to the manufacturer. In another
57
companion case, however, Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner,
the Court could not find irremediable adverse consequences
resulting from the manufacturer being forced into a later
challenge of the regulation there involved. The Court said:
This is not a situation in which primary conduct is affectedwhen contracts must be negotiated, ingredients tested or substituted, or special records compiled. This regulation merely states
that the Commissioner may authorize inspectors to examine certain processes or formulae; no advance action is required of cosmetics manufacturers, who since the enactment of the 1938
[FDC] Act have been under a statutory duty to permit reasonable inspection of a 'factory, warehouse, establishment, or vehicle
and all pertinent equipment finished and unfinished materials;
containers, and labeling therein.' § 704(a). Moreover, ...
unlike the other regulations challenged in this action, in which
seizure of goods, heavy fines, adverse publicity for distributing
'adulterated' goods and possible criminal liability might penalize
failure to comply, see Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., . . . a
refusal to admit an inspector here would at most lead only to
a suspension of certification services to the particular party, a
determination that can then be promptly challenged through an
administrative procedure, which in turn is reviewable by a
court. 58

The Court further stated that such review would be "an adequate forum for testing the regulation in a concrete situation." 59
The immediate economic harm in Upjohn is apparent also,
along with certain indirect consequences, such as adverse public
reaction, which ultimately affect the goodwill that the manufacturer and industry have created.60 The question as to whether
the public is adequately protected, because the drugs involved
in Upjohn could be sold only on the prescription of a physician,
relates to the harm factor. The Commissioner stated:
The FDA thinks that the physician wants to know which
drugs have been found ineffective and which present safety hazards. There are differences among physicians as well as drug
companies concerning the NAS reports. The essential question is
whether doctors should be informed by a responsible, objective
government agency of drug findings by the top medical and
scientific experts in the nation. The conclusion is that the FDA
56. 387 U.S. 167 (1967).

57. 387 U.S. 158 (1967).

See also note 33 supra.

58. 387 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1967).

59. Id. at 165.
60. See note 55 supra.
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does have that responsibility under the law, and that physicians
do want to receive that information. 61
62
Lastly, Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner,
is of interest
because the Court found the controversy not ripe for adjudication. By comparing the Court's reasoning in this case with
Abbott, a more complete understanding of the ripeness doctrine,
as it applied to this type of action, is possible. In Toilet Goods,
the Court considered a regulation which permitted the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, under certain circumstances, to order
the inspection of certain facilities and data, and, if a manufacturer refused to allow these inspections, permitted the Commissioner to refuse certification of color additives manufactured at
that plant.6 8 While the requirements that the regulation constituted a final agency action and that the issue raised a purely
legal question were satisfied, the requirement that the regulation be phrased in such a manner as to affect the primary
conduct of the parties was not. Since the regulation merely
served notice that the Commissioner might order an inspection
and that he might refuse certification, it had no immediate effect
upon the plaintiffs:

Whether the regulation is justified thus depends not only . . .
on whether Congress refused to include a specific section of the
Act authorizing such inspections, . . . but also on whether the
statutory scheme as a whole justified promulgation of the regulation .. . This will depend not merely on an inquiry into statutory purpose, but concurrently on an understanding of what types
of enforcement problems are encountered by the FDA, the need
for various sorts of supervision in order to effectuate the goals
of the Act, and the safeguards devised to protect legitimate trade
secrets ....
We believe that judicial appraisal of these factors
is likely to stand on a much surer footing in the context of a
specific application of this regulation than could be the case in
the framework of the generalized challenge made here. 64
In addition, the Court pointed out that the plaintiff was
faced with no great hardship if relief was denied. Unlike Abbott
or Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn, Inc., no heavy financial burden
or likelihood of prosecution would result from a failure to enjoin
the regulation. At the most, refusal to permit inspection would
merely result in temporary suspension of certification services.
This, the Court pointed out, could be challenged promptly
through administrative procedure and judicial review.
Thus, it appears from the foregoing cases that where imme61. Ley, The Doctor, The Patient, and The FDA, 19 CLEV.
REv.15, 17 (1970).
62. 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
63. Id. at 161.

64. Id. at 163-64.

STATE L.

19761

Invalid FDA Regulations

diate, detrimental harm "5 has resulted from agency action
which may be deemed final, and where the issue raised is purely
legal, the courts will more readily conclude that the case is ripe
for judicial review. This is especially so when the court would
not otherwise be interfering with the ongoing administration of
the agency.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The requirement that a case be ripe for judicial review is
closely related to the inquiry into exhaustion of administrative
remedies, in that both are concerned with the timing of judicial
review of an administrative action. They are, however, distinguishable. The former requirement is concerned with the
question of whether the controversy is within the scope of permissible judicial function; the latter is related only to the narrow
question of whether a party should be required to pursue further
administrative remedies before being allowed into court. 66
In the classic case of Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp.,6 7 the Supreme Court considered the question of whether
a federal distsrict court had equity jurisdiction to enjoin the
National Labor Relations Board from holding a hearing prior to
the issuance of a regulation. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the
Court, held that the district court was without power to enjoin
the Board from holding the hearings. In the course of his
opinion, the Justice articulated the long-settled rule of judicial
administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief until all
administrative remedies have been exhausted. 8 Despite this
rule, however, the Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed judicial review without complete exhaustion. 69 On other occasions,
65. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc., 387 U.S. 167 (1967); Abbott
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp.
241 (W.D. Mich. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970).

66. See L. JAFFE, JuDIciAL CONTROL oF ADmimn rRATmV AcTION chs. 10-

11 (abr. student ed. 1965).
67. 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
68. The [builder's] contention is at war with the long settled rule
of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief
for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. That rule has been repeatedly
acted on in cases where, as here, the contention is made that the
administrative body lacked power over the subject matter.
Obviously, the rule requiring exhaustion of the administrative
remedy cannot be circumvented by asserting that the charge on
which the complaint rests is groundless and that the mere holding
of the prescribed administrative hearing would result in irreparable
damage. Lawsuits also often prove to have been groundless; but
no way has been discovered of relieving a defendant from the necessity of a trial to establish the fact.
Id. at 50-52.
69. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) (exhaustion not required
and equity powers of court present where administrator allegedly acted
outside of statutory power and statute provided no adequate alternative
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70
however, the Court has required strict adherence to the rule.

The Court's reasoning is frequently very difficult to distinguish,
but a reading of important cases since Myers indicates that the
Court will relent in requiring full exhaustion where the issue
presented for review relates to the possibility of the administration's having indulged in ultra vires acts. In addition, the Court
has relented in situations involving immediate detrimental harm.
This, of course, must be balanced by a strong desire on the part

of the Court to refrain from interference with various actions
taken by the agency. An important factor that helps the Court
to decide what action to take is the availability of alternate remedies to the petitioning party.
In Abbott, exhaustion may be implied, for the administrator
was found to be acting outside of his jurisdiction. 7 1 Justice
Friendly's opinion in Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC,72 seems to reveal one
of the typical responses to such a problem in the area of
exhaustion:
Although the Federal Trade Commission Act limits review
by a court of appeals to 'any person, partnership, or corporation
required by an order of the Commission to cease and desist,'
15 U.S.C. § 45 (c), we agree with appellants that the fact that
the order here assailed is not one requiring PepsiCo to cease and
desist from anything does not lead inexorably to the conclusion
that it is not reviewable, but only that it is not reviewable by
petition to a court of appeals. . . . Whether it was reviewable
by suit in a district court depends on the construction given to
the first two sentences of § 10 (c) of the APA, now 5 U.S.C.
§ 704:
Agency action may be reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy
in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary,
remedies); accord, Public Utils. Comm'n v. United Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456
(1943); Utah Fuel Co. v. Nat'l Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56
(1939); Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. '557, 562-63
(1919) (notwithstanding petitioner's failure to obtain redress from the
administration itself).
70. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (preliminary, non-final action by administrator is not one where exhaustion
could be avoided); Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S.
752 (1947) (where full statutory remedy scheme was provided in enabling act and act also provided for exclusive jurisdiction in agency in
order to develop internally congressional policy, exhaustion will be required and court will lack equity jurisdiction to cut off, prematurely,
agency disposition); Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
304 U.S. 209 (1938) (same).
71. The Court never specifically referred to exhaustion, but it must
be remembered that where an action is begun in a district court to question whether the FDA has acted ultra vires its statutory authority, the
action is one not within either the FDC or the APA review provisions.
Rather, it is in the nature of an original action in equity to declare the
FDA's action as unconstitutional for want of statutory authority and to
enjoin the agency from enforcing such action. See also cases cited at
note 69 supra.
72. 472 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1972).
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procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not
directly reviewable is73subject to review on the review of
the final agency action.
Since the Pepsico order was not one made reviewable by statute,
its reviewability hinged on whether it constituted final agency
action within APA § 704. Legislative history of the APA did
not clear up the problem of what was meant by this phrase.74
Thus, does § 704 mean that interlocutory rulings were never to
be reviewed until there was finality in the traditional sense, or
do the words "preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency
action or ruling not directly reviewable" imply that some action
may be reviewed directly?7 5 Since the wording of this section
of the APA appears to be in contradistinction to the Myers holding which required full exhaustion, the framers of the APA,
familiar as they must have been with that case, probably would
have used stronger language had it been intended that Myers
be overruled by the Procedure Act.76 What the phrase "preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action . . ." should
mean is that if the action otherwise meets the requisites for
avoiding exhaustion, it should be directly reviewable at that
time.
As previously stated, the decisions are both conflicting and
seemingly indistinguishable. 77
An attempt, however, should
always be made to distinguish between a case involving imminent
harm and actual harm. The important question is, at what expense should this distinction be drawn? Abuse of overemphasizing the harm factor could give a federal district court judge the
opportunity to halt the regulatory process, and to do so even
on the basis of abstractions and generalities instead of a concrete
fact situation.78 The judge must have an understanding of the
73. Id. at 185.
74. Id. at 186.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Professor Davis feels that there are three key factors, however, that may help to distinguish these cases:
[The] extent of injury from pursuit of administrative remedy, [the]
degree of apparent clarity or doubt about administrative jurisdiction, and [the] involvement of specialized administrative understanding in the question of jurisdiction.
3 DAvs, ADIn=sTRATmv LAw TsRATisE § 20.03, at 69 (1958). Compare
McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971) with, McKart v. United
States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
78. In the opinion which dissented to Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n,
Inc., 387 U.S. 167, 174-76 (1967), where exhaustion was not required, Mr.
Justice Fortas stated that:
I am in agreement with the Court in No. 336, Toilet Goods Assn.
v. Gardner, that we should affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holding that the authority of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to promulgate the regulation
there involved may not be challenged by injunctive or declaratory
judgment action. . . . It requires that manufacturers afford employ-
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enforcement problems of the agency and the necessity for some
supervision over the regulated industry.
In the Upjohn case, the district court did not seem to have
considered the specific problem of exhaustion. The court said,
merely, that the Federal Register announcement constituted a
final order. Consideration of the nature of this announcement,
however, indicates that it did not constitute a final order and
that the plaintiff had not exhausted its administrative remedies.
The order published in the Federal Register79 provided that
objections to the order could be submitted within a thirty day
period and that a hearing on the objections could be requested.
Despite the fact that there was no provision for a stay of the order
pending a hearing on objections, the procedures described constituted additional administrative remedies available to the plaintiff. These remedies were not pursued, however, prior to the filing
of the initial complaint in the district court. This failure to exhaust the available administrative remedies, even though these
remedies were not statutorily prescribed, did not preclude the
granting of the preenforcement injunctive relief prayed for by
the plaintiff. First, had the injunctive relief been disallowed,
the injury threatening the plaintiff would have been great. In
addition to the loss of sales, adverse publicity and the consequent
loss of confidence by physicians in its sensitive products would
have constituted an enormous burden. Second, the Upjohn
action Was predicated on the theory that the FDA lacked jurisdiction to provide the additional remedies. Finally, an opportunity to be heard on the merits of a given action involving a
question of administrative jurisdiction should always be available; a court is as competent as an administrator to make a judgment on that restricted question.
ees of the agency access to all manufacturing facilities, processes,
and formulae involved in the manufacture of color additives and intermediates, and provides that the Commissioner of Food and Drugs
'may immediately suspend certification service' so long as access is
denied....
I am, however, compelled to dissent from the decisions of the

Court in No. 39, Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardner, and No. 438, Gard-

ner v. Toilet Goods Assn....

The Court, by today's decisions in Nos. 39 and 438, has opened
Pandora's box. Federal injunctions will now threaten programs of
vast importance to the public welfare. The Court's holding here
strikes at programs for the public health. The dangerous precedent
goes even further. It is cold comfort-it is little more than delusion
-to read in the Court's opinion that 'It is scarcely to be doubted
that a court would refuse to postpone the effective date of an agency
action if the Government could show

. . .

that delay would be detri-

mental to the public health or safety.' Experience dictates, on the
contrary, that it can hardly be hoped that some federal judge somewhere will not be moved as the Court is here, by the cries of anguish
and distress of those regulated to grant a disruptive injunction.
79. Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 422 JF.2d 944, 961 (6th Cir. 1970).

1976]

Invalid FDA Regulations

Standing
Although standing ordinarily does not present a problem in
a discussion involving the FDA, it certainly must be considered
and dealt with when one examines the area of justiciability.
With this in mind, some brief comment should be made before
proceeding further.
The standing of petitioners seeking preenforcement judicial
review of FDA actions should be clear. Although early cases
stated the proposition that economic harm which took the form
of a mere loss of competitive edge was not sufficient injury in
fact,8 0 today economic harm, no matter the source, should
suffice, if capable of objective proof and if the petitioner is otherwise within the class of those who were intended to be protected
by the relevant enabling statute."' This is confirmed in APA
§ 702 which states that a person aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of the relevant statute would suffice. Additionally, it is interesting to note that loss of goodwill in the form
of adverse publicity is now recognized as injury in fact in preen82
forcement reviews of FDA actions.
ATTACKING THE MERrrs

After a petitioner seeking preenforcement judicial review has
been able to persuade a court of the case's present justiciable
status, the petitioner must still be able to present a case which,
on the merits, is capable of judicial resolution. To accomplish
this latter task a petitioner may often be powerless, for the case
may be either an intermediate administrative action which is not
otherwise "final" within APA § 704 and thus not containing a
purely legal issue, or the action taken may lack a record of any
administrative proceeding, leaving the court with no basis upon
which to make a determination as to whether the action below
met the standard of review to be applied.
Review Without a Record
Depending upon the statute, here the FDC Act, an administrator may have been given one or more of several mandatory
or permissive powers in relationship to the administrative actions
with which he has been charged. Under the FDC Act the Commissioner need not, for example, be required to hold an evidentiary hearing before the promulgation of any regulation.8 3
80. E.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
81. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
82. See note and text accompanying note 55 supra.
83. Early Supreme Court cases considering the question of a require-
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When a regulation is thus promulgated, there is no "record
below" of any administrative proceedings, and the courts' real
ment for an opportunity to be heard in administrative proceedings established the rule that such hearings were mandatory. Londoner v. Denver,
210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908).
Several exceptions to this general rule, however, have been created
by later cases. For example, hearings are not required where a very
large number of persons are affected by the regulation and such hearings
would be impractical. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
239 U.S. 441 (1915). A more pertinent exception was articulated in
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 205 (1956) where the
Court stated: "We do not think Congress intended the Commission to
waste time on applications that do not state a valid basis for a hearing.
If any applicant is aggrieved by a refusal, the way for review is open."
As such, the Court in Storer reversed a circuit court decision which required the FCC to grant a hearing prior to denying an application for
a radio station. This exception to the general rule was restated by the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Producers Livestock Marketing
Ass'n v. United States, 241 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1957), aff'd sub nom. Denver Union Stockyard Co. v. Producers Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 356
U.S. 282 (1958):
[I]t is fundamental to the law that the submission of evidence is
not required to characterize 'a full hearing' where such evidence is
Where no genuine or maimmaterial to the issue to be decided ....
terial issue of fact is presented the court or administrative body may
pass upon the issues of law after according the parties the right of
argument.
241 F.2d 192, 196 (10th Cir. 1957). Professor Davis has suggested that
application of this exception to the general rule requires a distinction
to be drawn between what he calls "adjudicative facts" and "legislative
facts." The former category would include "facts about the parties and
their activities, businesses, and properties," and are susceptible to evidential proof. See, e.g., Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). The
latter group would include "general facts which help the tribunal decide
questions of law, policy, and discretion." See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). Professor Davis points
out that the administrative process is particularly well adapted to the
determination of adjudicative facts, and, for this reason, a hearing should
be required whenever an issue of this type is presented. Legislative
facts, on the other hand, primarily involve questions of policy and discretion and, by their nature, are not susceptible to evidential proof.
Formal hearings, he concluded, should not be required when the issues
to be determined are entirely within this latter category. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV.
L. Rav. 364 (1942). See, e.g., Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407
(1955).
In Upjohn plaintiff admitted that it had not further evidence to offer
beyond-that previously submitted to the FDA before it issued its decertification order, but argued that a hearing would enable it to present
evidence bearing upon such questions as whether lab tests have predictive value for the use of certain drugs by man, whether a drug's widespread clinical success entitled it to probative weight in evaluating overall drug efficacy, what constituted an adequate and well controlled
study, what is the acceptable incidence of side effects for antibiotics, and
whether it is rational to use combination antibiotic drugs. FDC REP. 9
(December 1, 1969). As each of these questions would seem to have
involved "legislative" type fact determinations rather than "adjudicative" or individualized fact findings, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit rightfully found that a hearing was not mandated before the
order of May 15 was put into force and effect. One reason for such a
distinction in the Upjohn case rests upon the fact that, as to the type
of questions advanced by the drug manufacturer as outlined above, experts might testify as to their opinions on the issues there involved, but,
in the final analysis, their testimony would remain nothing more than
opinion to be considered by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs in exercising his judgment or discretion.
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inquiry is whether such a promulgation was warranted by a view
of the enabling legislation. 84 At least, however, there is an element of notice present in this situation, that in view of the
administrator's promulgation there may be a future application
of that regulation to a particular manufacturer. One might also
call the questions on this type of review ones dealing solely with
"legislative facts," involving primarily a determination of
whether the administrator has made statutorily permissible
policy determinations.8 5
A similar situation is presented when the FDA Commissioner
takes summary action, such as a seizure of tainted foods, for
again there is no hearing or record for a court to review. Yet
the inquiry on review is not as limited as in the former case,
for here there has been an adjudication, albeit one wherein no
factual evidence was presented before a sanction or penalty has
been imposed or threatened. Under the FDC Act the Commissioner may take such summary action and not be enjoined on
the merits, particularly where he has not abused the discretion
granted him by the enabling statute. Thus, whether there has
been such an abuse of discretion is a first type of review standard, and is especially applicable where imminent physical harm
to the public can be foreseen; a court will not lightly enjoin a
seizure of potentially lethal substances"" unless there has been
a clear abuse of the administrator's discretionary powers.
Courts also will be reluctant to entertain a hearing on the
merits where, although no physical injury factor is involved with
respect to the Commissioner's action, the courts would prefer
to delay a hearing for fear of interfering with the development
of overall agency policy. This is particularly true in cases where
a preliminary order has been issued to a given manufacturer and
the agency may yet resolve the overall controversy in favor of
that manufacturer. This situation was exemplified by Toilet
8 7
where a rule was promulgated
Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner,
to the effect that, where agency personnel have been refused
entry to inspect a cosmetics manufacturer's facilities, suspension
by decertification of the right to manufacture was mandated. In
affirming the lower court's holding that the rule itself was not
reviewable, the Supreme Court held that review on the merits
could be allowed only where the rule had been applied. In the
Court's reasoning, in addition to the absence of immediate harm
84. E.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); NLRB v.

Hearst
supra.
85.
86.
87.

Pubs., Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).

See cases cited at note 69

See note 83 supra.
Ewing v. Mytinger &Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
387 U.S. 1,58 (1967).
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to any manufacturer, the agency should be given the first right
or opportunity to apply its own rule within its conception of the

legislative policy which it had been charged to effect. Thus,
where preenforcement review and injunctive relief could disrupt
ongoing agency policy determinations, a court will deny judicial
review on the merits.
Review with a Record
Where a regulation has been promulgated or an adjudication
made on the basis of some type of evidential hearing, however,
the nature and scope of judicial review greatly changes. The
FDC Act 8 and the APA89 both provide for review of record
agency actions within the purview of the substantial evidence
rule. In this context, however, a court may pay deference to

preceding administrative determinations by taking the position
that the agency is expert within its respective mandate and had

the opportunity to view evidence presented on a first-hand basis.
The central issue presented by the Upjohn Co. v. Finch9 "
case, for example, was whether the FDA could, by administrative
88. 5 U.S.C. § 371(f).
89. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
90. 303 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mich. 1969), affd, 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir.
1970). As this case will supply the basis for discussion for the remainder
of this section, it would be of use to more fully elucidate the background
of the controversy. Under section '507(a) of the FDC Act 21 U.S.C. §
357(a), the Commissioner of Food and Drugs is authorized to promulgate regulations which provide for certification of antibiotic drugs as safe
and effective. In 1956, the Commissioner, acting pursuant to this statutory authority, promulgated regulations for the certification of combinations of tetracycline and novobiocin. In Upjohn, plaintiff's Panalba
products were certified as 'being both safe and effective pursuant to these
regulations and were marketed first in 1957.
In 1958, pursuant to section 505 of the FDC Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355,
the Commissioner approved a New Drug Application (NDA) for the
marketing of Albamycin, a drug containing calcium novobiocin and sulfamethizole. In 1964, the Commissioner promulgated section 148(j).4 of
the Regulations of the Food and Drug Administration, providing for the
certification of antibiotic drugs containing calcium novobiocin and sulfamethizole as safe and effective.
The FDC Act, as amended in 1962 by the Harris-Kefauver amendments, 21 U.S.C. § 357(a), added the premarketing criterion of drug efficacy to the existing criterion of drug safety for new drugs. The FDA
took the position that these amendments constituted a mandate to review
the efficacy of all drugs which had been marketed from 1938 to 1968,
and which previously had received FDA premarket approval on the
grounds of safety alone. Recognizing that the facilities of the FDA were
nadequate to cope with the monumental task implicit in this review,
the Administration
for the conduct
on June
23, 196,Council
contracted
with the National
Acad(NAS-NRC)
Research
emy of Sciences-National
of this review. Despite the fact that the FDC Act previously had
required
proof
of effectiveness
for to
thebe certification
of review.
antibiotics, 21
included in this
drugs were
(a), antibiotic
U.S.C. § 357
of
combinations
Study Group
Efficacy
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containing
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antibiotics
year
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a
After
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reported that, in
then
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to these drugs are comReactions
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are potentially dangerous
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order based upon independent findings, revoke prior certification
of plaintiff's antibiotic drugs. Section 507(h) of the FDC Act
provides that regulations for the certification of such drugs as
mon, and the reactions can be severe or even fatal. The use of both
drugs simultaneously therefore increases the risk to the patient, and
the combination is to be avoided for this reason....
.. The question of the control of drug dosage should always
be considered when fixed drug combinations are used. In this situation, the physician never finds it possible to increase or lower the
dose of one component of the mixture without at the same time affecting the dose of the other. In this circumstance, the tendency is
either to raise the dose of one drug to a desired level and thus inadvertently to give an overdose of the other; or to lower the dose of
one component to a desired level and consequently give an insufficient dose of the other....
...On these bases, it is strongly urged that use of these fixed
combinations no longer be recommended.
National Academy of Sciences, Drug Efficacy Study, A Report to the
Comm'r of Food and Drugs 127-28 (1969).
Following receipt of the NAS-NRC report, the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs, on December 24, 1968, published a notice of intent to initiate
proceedings to amend the antibiotic regulations and delete Upjohn's combination antibiotic drugs from the list of those drugs acceptable for certification. The announcement stated that the NAS-NRC study group had
found these products to be ineffective as a fixed combination for the indications specified in the labeling. The announcement added that the FDA
concurred with the NAS-NRC Drug Efficacy Study Group "that there
[was] a lack of substantial evidence that each ingredient [in the] combinations contributes to the claimed clinical effect." 34 Fed. Reg. 7689.
On May 15, 1969, the Administration published an order in the Federal Register amending the regulations so as to provide for the repeal
of those regulations permitting certification of the plaintiff's drug products, revoking all certificates previously issued, and stating that no further batches would be certified. This order stated that it was based upon
a lack of substantial evidence of the drugs' efficacy. The order further
provided that it was to become effective thirty days after its publication
"to allow time for a recall [of plaintiff's products] to be completed." In
addition, objections to the order could be submitted within the thirty
day period and a hearing could be requested on the basis of a statement
by the objecting party which request contained reasonable grounds, identifying claimed errors in the NAS-NRC report evaluations and any adequate and well controlled investigations on the basis of which the FDA
could conclude that the combination drugs would have the effectiveness
claimed and would be safe for their intended use. However, there was
no provision for a stay of the order pending a hearing on the objections.
On May 27, 1969, the Upjohn Company filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and for injunctive relief, alleging that defendants "acted
in excess of their authority and without observance of the procedures
required by law, and arbitrarily and capriciously, in that the order contravened plaintiff's right to an evidentiary hearing prior to the removal
of its products from the market."
In support of its complaint, the plaintiff pointed out that it was frequently impractical or even impossible for the physician to have the specific microorganisms responsible for an infection identified so that a specific antibiotic could be selected for its treatment. In these cases, it argued, there was no alternative to the use of a broad spectrum combination of antibiotics. The components of Panalba and Albamycin were individually active against a variety of microorganisms, and the activity
of each of the components of these products complemented that of the
others. Panalba and Albamycin had achieved wide acceptance by the
medical community; many billions of doses of these products had been
used since they were introduced. The drugs frequently were considered
lifesaving and constituted an accepted part of the physician's arsenal
against disease. The plaintiff admitted that although it would have
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were there threatened with decertification may be amended or
repealed on a finding by the Commissioner
on the basis of new information with respect to such drug
evaluated together with the information before him when the
was approved, that there is a lack of substantial
application ...
evidence ...
that the drug has the effect it purports or is
represented to have under such conditions of use. 91

The specific procedures for amendment or repeal of antibiotic
regulations set forth in § 507(f) 9 2 of the FDC Act provide for
notice of proposed action, an opportunity to present views, and
a hearing on objections which state "reasonable grounds" in
opposition to any final order amending or repealing a regulation.
On September 19, 1969, the FDA Commissioner published,
in the Federal Register, 98 his interpretation of the nature of

evidence required to provide "substantial evidence" of effectiveness under the Act. The interpretation provided that only clinical investigations meeting the criteria spelled out in the regulations would be deemed as the types of adequate and well controlled investigations which could be considered as providing substantial evidence of effectiveness. 94 The regulations made clear
that all other clinical tests and documented clinical experience

would not be considered relevant to the determination of
whether the statutory requirement had been satisfied.
The plaintiff argued this interpretation of "substantial evidence" was invalid because it imposed arbitrary criteria "in a
rigid and narrow fashion not intended or authorized by Conbeen preferable ideally to identify the specific microorganisms causing
a disease and prescribe individual antibiotics for their treatment, it contended that this did not establish the ineffectiveness of the combinations
of antibiotics, but merely that they were only relatively less effective
than the ideal treatment. It argued that the FDC Act did not authorize
the defendants to delete an antibiotic drug, otherwise acceptable for certification, on the grounds of relative efficacy.
The plaintiff prayed for the repeal of the FDA's regulation which
provided for the decertification of Upjohn's products and for the order
revoking certifications previously issued under those regulations to be
declared null and void. Plaintiff asked that the court restrain the defendants from enforcing the order and require the defendants to continue
certification of any batch of the plaintiff's products which complied with
the previous regulations. As one can readily see, this is a typical example of agency action which results in the promulgation of a regulation
to which a client-manufacturer very well may be bound. The importance of understanding this administrative process is also critical in
determining whether agency action is "final" within the meaning of the
FDC and APA Acts. See generally Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp.
241 (W.D. Mich. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 357(h) (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. 422 F.2d 944, 949 (6th Cir. 1970).
94. Id. at 957-60. In general, the regulations provided for "controls"
in which the drug tested is compared with an inactive placebo or, where
placebo therapy would be unethical, with another active drug. In rare
cases, -an "historical control" was permitted, in which the drug tested
was compared with prior experience.
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gress." 9 5 As thus presented, resolution of the key issue in
Upjohn turned on the question of legislative intent in the use
of the phrase "substantial evidence" in the FDC Act. To determine that intent, an examination of the legislative history of the
1962 Drug Act Amendments which introduced that phrase into
the Act was necessary.
Part 1 of the Senate Judiciary Committee's final report on
the amendments' bill contained the following comments:
The term 'substantial evidence' is used to require that therapeutic claims for new drugs be supported by reliable pharmacological and clinical studies. When a drug has been adequately tested
by qualified experts and has been found to have the effect
claimed for it, this claim should be permitted even though there
may be preponderant evidence to the contrary based upon equally
reliable studies. There may also be a situation in which a new
drug has been studied in a limited number of hospitals and clinics
and its effectiveness established only to the satisfaction of a few
investigators qualified to use it. There may be many physicians
who would deny the effectiveness simply on the basis of a disbelief growing out of their past experience with other drugs or
with the diseases involved. Again, the studies may show that
the drug will help a substantial percentage of the patients in
a given disease condition but will not be effective in other cases.
What the committee intends is to permit the claim for this new
drug to be made to the medical profession with a proper explanation of the basis on which it rests. 96
The plaintiff argued that this indicated that the legislative
purpose in establishing the "substantial evidence" test was to
reflect and accommodate the fact that clinical experts often disagree as to the effectiveness of a drug and, further, that the
standard was designed to insure that any drug believed by a
respectable number of experts to be effective could be marketed,
even if the view of the majority of experts was that the drug
was not effective. The plaintiff also pointed out that the report
stated:
In such a delicate area of medicine, the committee wants
to make sure that safe new drugs become available for use by
the medical profession so long as they are supported as to effectiveness by a responsible body of opinion. 97
This view, the plaintiff contended, was supported by comments
made during the floor debates on the amendments. Senator
Hruska, the author of the amendments which introduced the
phrase "substantial evidence" into the bill, stated that the
purpose of the test
95. FDC REP. 10 (December 1, 1969).
96. S. REP. No. 1744, pt. 1, 87th Cong., 2d Seas., 1962 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 2892.
97. Id.
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is to permit legitimate differences of opinion among responsible
clinicians to be resolved by the medical profession in day to day
practice, instead of being resolved for all doctors against the
effectiveness of the drug by the fiat of the FDA staff.98

Senator Eastland, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee that
reported the bill out, expressed the same thought:
The committee recognized that legitimate differences of opinion
may exist among responsible clinicians with respect to the effectiveness of a particular new drug. Experience has shown that
a majority of so-called experts has often been wrong in initially
condemning a new drug, just as new inventions in other fields
are usually regarded with skepticism and often with hostility.99
Therefore, the dominant legislative purpose of the substantial

evidence test, plaintiff argued, was inconsistent with any notion
that the FDA could eliminate responsible expert opinion as to
the efficacy of a drug from administrative consideration by proscribing all but a single type of acceptable clinical test. Responsible experts may disagree as to whether particular tests are adequate and well controlled and whether such tests are probative
of the effectiveness of the drug. To limit acceptable evidence
to that derived from a particular kind of clinical testing itself
establishes a medical and pharmacological orthodoxy-precisely
the result Congress sought to foreclose by the substantial
evidence test.
Plaintiff pointed to the millions of doses of its products
which had been administered, and to the overwhelming acceptance which their products received from the medical profession.
This substantial clinical experience, Upjohn argued, together
with the clinical test data submitted at the time Panalba and
Albamycin were certified, should have been fairly regarded as
constituting substantial evidence of effectiveness.
To rebut this argument, the Government pointed out that
the FDC Act itself defines the phrase "substantial evidence" in
§ 505(d) as,
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness
of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could be fairly
and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will
have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the
conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
labeling . . . .100
Yet the significance of this definition can be understood fully
only in the context of the legislative developments of the 1962
98. 108 CONG. REc. 10,108 (1962) (remarks by Senator Hruska).
99. Id. at 17,366 (remarks by Senator Eastland).
100. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (emphasis added).
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Drug Amendments. These amendments were introduced originally by Senators Kefauver and Hart as S. 1552 on April 12, 1961.
The bill was reported out favorably by Senator Kefauver's Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, but encountered strong
opposition in the parent Judiciary Committee. Largely as a
result of the now famous "thalidomide" affair,10 1 which occurred
at about the same time, however, there was considerable public pressure for the passage of some bill designed to strengthen
the food and drug laws. Senators Eastland and Hruska, principal
opponents of the Kefauver Bill, drafted a substitute measure
which bore little semblance to the original Kefauver version.
This variation was reported out of the Judiciary Committee on
July 12, 1962,102 and formed the basis of the final bill. It is
important to note that, at this stage, the bill did not contain the
definition of substantial evidence quoted above. Much of the
legislative history cited by plaintiff concerned the earlier version
of the bill and, in the light of later developments, was inapplicable to a determination of the meaning of the phrase as used
in the final bill, for even the Eastland-Hruska version proved
to be unacceptable to the President of the United States.
On August 4, 1962, President Kennedy wrote to Senator Eastland
suggesting further amendments, one of which read, in part:
Section 8 of S. 1552 requires 'substantial evidence' of effectiveness to be submitted with each new drug application. This
standard of proof is inadequate in terms of assuring that drugs
that reach the market have been shown to be effective for the
claims made for them.108

Subsequently, and in response to the President's criticism,
the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out a new version of
the Drug Amendments bill incorporating the above definition of
substantial evidence.10 4 Speaking of this version of the bill in
part 2 of the Judiciary Committee's final report, Senator Eastland said:
[A] definition of 'substantial evidence' has now been added to
the bill concerning what would constitute such evidence. The
amendment provides that 'substantial evidence' means evidence
consisting of adequate and well controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug
involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly
be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect
101. See generally S. RFP. No. 1744, pt. 1, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin, News 2905-908.
102. Id. at 2884.
103. 108 CONG. Rwc. 15,696 (1962) (read into the Record by Senator
Kefauver).
104. The revised version of S. 1552 was reported out on August 21,
1962, and passed in the Senate two days later, as Public Law 87-781 (Oct.
10, 1962).
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it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.
That is to say, a claim could be rejected if it were found (a)
that the investigations were not 'adequate'; (b) that they were
not 'well controlled'; (c) that they had been conducted by experts
not qualified to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for which
the application is made; or (d) that the conclusions drawn by
such experts -could not fairly and responsibly be derived from
their investigations.' 0 5
Careful review of the legislative history of the 1962 amendments does not reveal any further attempt to define the phrase
"adequate and well controlled investigations," the key portion of
the statutory definition of substantial evidence. The conclusion
is inescapable, however, that Congress intended to leave the
determination of what would constitute such adequate and well
controlled investigations to the expertise of the FDA Commissioner.
The criteria for an adequate and well controlled investigation
published by the Commissioner in the September 19, 1969 Federal
Register,08 far from being a revolution in the accepted standards of drug testing, as claimed -by the plaintiff, represented a
consensus of modern medical opinion. The Commissioner reviewed leading medical textbooks,10 7 government reports, 0 8
and testimony by physicians' 0 9 before arriving at these criteria.
That these criteria were, in fact, generally recognized by the
medical profession as being the basis of a well controlled study
was evidenced by the fact that they were remarkably similar
to those described in a history of the Upjohn Company written
for the plaintiff itself in 1961.110
Where, as in Upjohn, the determination of a mixed question
of fact and law has been delegated explicitly by statute to an
administrative body, the courts have been hesitant to substitute
their own judgment for that of the agency. In Gray v.
Powell,"' the Bituminous Coal Division of the Department of
the Interior had refused to classify the Seaboard Railway Company as a "producer" of bituminous coal pursuant to statutory
authority to establish such classifications. Respondents, receivers of the railway, challenged the Board's classification as
105. S. REP. No. 1744, pt. 2, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1962).
106. 422 F.2d 944, 949 (6th Cir. 1970).
107. E.g., GOODMAN & GILMAN, Tim PnARMAcoLoGIcAL BASIS OF TEMA-

PEuTics (1965).

108. World Health Org. Tech. Rep. Series No. 403, Principles for the

Clinical Evaluation of Drugs (1967).

109. Hearings on Drug Industry Antitrust Act before the Senate

Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 45

et seq. (1961).

110. L. ENGEL, MEmiciNE MAKERs OF KALAMAzoo
111. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).

(1961).
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being contrary to the evidence. The Supreme Court supported
the Board, stating:
Congress, which could have legislated specifically as to the
individual exemptions from the [Bituminous Coal] code, found
it more efficient to delegate that function to those whose experience in a particular field gave promise of a better informed,
more equitable, adjustment of the conflicting interests .

. .

. By

thus committing the execution of its policies to the specialized
personnel of the Bituminous Coal Division, Congress followed a
familiar practice ...
Where, as here, a determination has been left to an administrative body, this delegation will be respected and the administrative conclusion left untouched. Certainly, a finding on Congressional reference that an admittedly constitutional act is applicable to a particular situation does not require such further
scrutiny. Although we have here no dispute as to the evidentiary
facts, that does not permit a court to substitute its judgment
for that of the Director. .

.

.

It is not the province of a court

to absorb the administrative functions to such an extent that the
executive or legislative agencies become mere fact-finding bodies
112
deprived of the advantages of prompt and definite action.
Similarly, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.," 8 the Supreme Court considered the question of whether the NLRB could
-properly interpret certain newsboys as "employees" under broad
statutory classes set out in the National Labor Relations Act.
The publisher argued that its relationship to the newsboys was
clearly that of employer-independent contractor rather than that
of employer-employee. The Supreme Court, in rejecting the contention that any common law standards were applicable, stated:
Whether .

.

. the term 'employee' includes such workers as

these newsboys must be answered primarily from the history,
terms and purposes of the legislation..
[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad
statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's
function is limited ....
[T]he Board's determination that specified persons are 'employees' under this Act is to be accepted if
11 4
it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law.
Thus, the general rule which appears to have been applied by
the. Supreme Court in most cases involving broad statutory terms
whose interpretation and application have been delegated specifically by statute to administrative bodies, was articulated by
the Court in the leading case of Rochester Telephone Corp. v.
United States: 115
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 411-12.
322 U.S. 111 (1944).
Id. at 124, 131.
307 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1939).
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So long as there is warrant in the record for the judgment of
the expert body it must stand. .

.

'The judicial function is

exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.'

More importantly, this rule has been incorporated into the
APA, in § 10, which defines the scope of judicial review of
administrative actions, "except to the extent that ...

agency

action is committed to agency discretion by law," 116 to be that
"the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret . . . statutory provisions, and determine the meaning

or applicability of the terms of an agency action."11 7 The introductory phrase excepting agency action committed to agency discretion, clearly is a restatement of Rochester. The courts have
continued to apply this rule subsequent to the passage of the
APA, thus indicating their agreement with it. For example,
three years after passage of the APA, the Supreme Court stated:
The wisdom of the principle adopted [by the administrative
agency] is none of our concern....
[W]e are free to disturb the Commission's conclusion only if it
lacks any rational and statutory foundation.1 18

Moreover, it is generally recognized that administrative determinations consistent with statutory mandates and based upon
complex technical considerations should be given great weight
by the courts, even where the specific determination is itself subject to judicial review. 119 This deference to administrative expertise is based upon recognition of the fact that the agency is
expected to have developed its field beyond that point that could
be expected by the courts.120
It is apparent that upon application of these rules to Upjohn,
the appellate court should have and did find for the Government.
The FDC Act authorized the FDA Commissioner to revoke certification of antibiotic drugs upon a finding that there was a lack
of substantial evidence that the drug was effective. Further, the
Act defined substantial evidence as that evidence based upon adequate and well controlled investigations, and a review of the
legislative history of the Act outlined above indicated that Congress intended the Commissioner to prescribe the scientific content of such investigations. The criteria which the Commissioner
116. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (2).
117. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
118. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947). Accord, Consolo
v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607 (1966); Wolff v. Selective Serv.
Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2nd Cir. 1967); Friedman v. Schwellenbach,
159 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 838 (1946).
119. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); Colorado Interstate
Gas Co. v. FPC 370 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Great
N. Ry 337 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1964); Progressive Mine Workers Local
12 v. NLRB, 180 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951).
120. 1 DAvis, ADTMtm LAW Tmai'rSE § 5.05 (1958).
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prescribed appeared to be consistent with the substantial weight
of modern scientific and medical opinion, and could not be
described as arbitrary or capricious. Thus, there was "warrant
in the record" for the Commissioner's conclusion that the plaintiff failed to meet these criteria to establish substantial evidence
of the effectiveness of its antibiotic drugs. Further, considering
the fact that this determination was based upon highly complex
technical considerations, uniquely within the competence of the
FDA, the court's review of the Commissioner's determination was
rightfully limited.
The Trend
In Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc.,121 the
Supreme Court attempted to resolve certain questions that were
left unanswered in the Upjohn decision. After the 1962 amendments to the FDC Act, which also had prohibited the introduction into interstate commerce of a drug which had not been sanctioned by experts as safe and effective for the use for which it
had been intended, the FDA Commissioner withdrew approval
of a new drug application for respondent's drug, "Lutrexin," for
which there had been prior approval in 1952. The Commissioner denied the respondent manufacturer's request for a hearing, insisting that Lutrexin was not exempt under the grandfather clause of the 1962 amendments, and further that the
manufacturer had failed to submit substantial evidence that
Lutrexin was not a "new drug" or that it was effective. The
evidence which had been presented included a list of literature
references, a copy of an unpublished study, a representative
sample, a testimonial letter on behalf of the drug, and certain
additional data.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed on all but the
issue of Lutrexin's "new drug" status. Although it was the
opinion of the Court that the FDA did not have to grant a hearing before withdrawing approval of a new drug application
where the applicant had not tendered any evidence which, on
its face, met the statutory standards as particularized by FDA
regulations, in this instance the manufacturer's submission regarding the effectiveness of Lutrexin was sufficient to warrant
a hearing. Secondly, while Lutrexin was not exempt under the
grandfather clause of the 1962 amendments,'1 22

any decision

as to Lutrexin's "new drug" status would have to await the outcome of the administrative hearing.
121. 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
122. Id at 614.
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The Commissioner stated that scientific data submitted by
Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., was inadequate, and he published his intention to withdraw sanction of the new drug application (NDA) covering the drug, but gave Hynson the opportunity for a prewithdrawal hearing. Before the hearing took
place, Hynson went before the district court for a declaratory
judgment that the drug in question was exempt from the review
provisions of the 1962 amendments, 128 or, in the alternative,
that there was not a lack of substantial evidence 124 of the
drug's effectiveness. The district court ruled that the FDA had
primary jurisdiction and that Hynson had not exhausted its
administrative remedies.

25

Before the case was concluded in the district court, the FDA
created new regulations which established the minimal standards
for "adequate and well controlled investigations" and limited the
right to a hearing to those who could present some evidence
meeting those standards. 120 Hynson continued to maintain
that it was not subject to the new regulations due to its initial
request for a hearing preceding the issuance of the new regulations. In view of this proposition, Hynson made another hearing
request and submitted certain material which it said substantiated "substantial evidence" of Lutrexin's effectiveness. The
Commissioner denied the request, and withdrew the NDA for
Lutrexin. The Commissioner ruled that Lutrexin was not
exempt from the 1962 amendments, and that Hynson's submission
attempting to prove that Lutrexin was not a new drug was
insufficient.

The court of appeals reversed, 2 7 holding that

while the drugs in question did not have exempt status, Hynson
was entitled to a hearing on the substantial evidence ques28
tion.
Congress wrote into section 505(d) of the FDC Act its
definition of substantial evidence the necessity of "evidence consisting of adequate and well controlled investigations." The final
Senate report of this 1962 amendment concerning this necessity
made clear that this was an abrupt departure from previous
standards relative to the marketing of drugs, based on increasing
29
concern over the efficacy and safety of drugs.
Nevertheless, the FDC Act definitely required the FDA to
give "due notice and opportunity for hearing to the applicant"
before it could withdraw its approval of a NDA. Pursuant to
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id, at 616.
Id.
Id.

I

Id. at 616-17.
Id.
Id. at 617-20.
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this statutory requirement, the FDA, by regulation, required any
applicant who desired a hearing to submit reasons
why the application ... should not be withdrawn, together with

a well-organized and full-factual analysis of the clinical and
of
other investigational data he is prepared to prove in 1support
80
his opposition to the notice of opportunity of a hearing.
What the agency said, then, was that it would not provide a
formal hearing where it was apparent at the outset that the
applicant had not tendered any evidence which on its face met
the statutory standards particularized by the regulations.
While the court maintained that every manufacturer of a
challenged drug should have an opportunity to be heard, it
further stated that § 554(e) of the APA does not place administrative proceedings in a straitjacket. That section provides that
an agency, "in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order
The
to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty."''
thrust of the new procedures designed by Congress was the grant
of primary jurisdiction to the FDA, the expert agency it created.
Yet it is important to note that the FDA never has the final
say, for a review will be had, with certain exceptions, in a court
of appeals. The Court stressed this point when it said:
FDA does not have unbridled discretion to do what it pleases.
Its procedures must satisfy the rudiments of fair. play. Judicial
only after administrative remedies have been
relief is available
8 2
exhausted.'
The Court further stated that although the FDA was
empowered to decide the threshold question of whether the drug
was a "new drug," an interpretation and application of a broad
statutory term, that power is only an incident to its power to
approve or withdraw approvals of NDAs.188 While that order
was not therefore reviewable in an appellate court under §
505 (h) of the FDC Act, it was possible to have preenforcement
judicial review in a district court under §§ 701-704 of the
84

APA.1

SUnMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This article has explored the question of the availability of
declaratory and injunctive relief as a preenforcement remedy
against invalid administrative regulations. Particular reference
has been made to those regulations or orders promulgated pur130. Id. at 620.
131. Id. at 826.
132. Id. at 627.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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suant to the FDC Act through an examination of their applica35
tion to the complex issues presented in food and drug cases.1
Contrary to earlier belief, declaratory and injunctive relief
may now be available in the area of FDA regulations. However,
a series of jurisdictional hurdles must be overcome before such
relief can be made available. Two of the most difficult of these
which have been discussed are the questions of whether exhaustion of administrative remedies should be required and whether
the issues presented by the case are ripe for judicial review.
The law concerning the requirement of exhaustion is, at the
present, still incompletely resolved. While it is sometimes
required in full, at other times no exhaustion may be required
at all. Unfortunately the Supreme Court has not seen fit to
articulate clearly all the factors which need to be present to
obviate the requirement. The fact that Upjohn and Weinberger
might seem to be in opposition on this point is illustrative, for
the facts bear certain similarities.
In contrast, the question of ripeness for judicial review has
been substantially clarified, especially by the Abbott decision and
its progeny. These decisions set out the factors which the courts
should consider in any issue of ripeness: the regulation in question must be a "final agency action" within the enabling statute,
the issue presented must be purely legal in nature and free from
the overtones of factual determinations requiring administrative
expertise, and finally, the regulation must be one which immediately affects the day-to-day conduct of the parties-the harm
to the petitioner denied preenforcement relief being substantial.
In particular, these factors were found to exist in both Abbott
and Upjohn.
Once these hurdles are overcome, and only after they are
overcome, will a court consider the substantive merits raised.
Most of the substantive questions in the cases discussed in this
article dealt with the FDA's attempt to promulgate rulings or
orders pursuant to the various amendments Congress added to
the FDC Act in 1962.
The original Act had created a method for the premarketing
administrative review of the safety of therapeutic drugs. The
1962 amendments both continued and expanded the concepts of
premarketing review. The major substantive change made by
Congress was to require premarketing review of the effectiveness
as well as of the safety of "new drugs." Two key questions
135. For the latest developments in the recently publicized contro-

versy involving "Red Dye No. 2," a color additive for food suspected of

being cancer-causing, see F.D. CosM. REP. 41,494 (1975); id. at
(1976).

41,543
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present themselves at this juncture. In Upjohn, the first was
illustrated by the question of whether the FDA Commissioner
should have been required to hold formal hearings prior to
attempting to revoke certification of the petitioner's drugs. The
second was whether the Commissioner was authorized, under the
FDC Act, to revoke this certification.
Formal hearings are required only when the facts to be
determined by a hearing of an adjudicatory nature are susceptible of evidential proof. Where, on the other hand, they
are of a "legislative" nature, involving questions of policy determination and administrative discretion, a hearing will not often
be required. The facts of Upjohn placed the hearing demanded
by the plaintiff within this latter category; and the appellate
court rightfully denied the demand. In Weinberger, the Court
required the FDA to hold a hearing before withdrawing approval
of a NDA only where it conclusively appears from the data in
the application and from the reasons and factual analysis in the
request for a hearing that the applicant has tendered evidence
which meets statutory standards.
A determination of whether the Commissioner is authorized
by the FDC Act to revoke certification of a petitioner's drugs, such
as Lutrexin, can be made only by reference to the legislative
history of the Act. It has been made clear from a review of
that history that Congress intended the Commissioner should be
the sole judge of whether there is substantial evidence that a
given drug has the effect it purports or is represented to have,
and to require him to withdraw any antibiotic drug which
fails to meet the statutory standard as interpreted by the Commissioner in FDA regulations or orders. Where agency action
is thus committed by law to agency discretion, the scope of judicial review becomes limited. Irrespective of the wisdom of the
agency's action, it must stand as long as there was warrant in
the record for the conclusions it came to as an expert body. This
was found to be the case in Upjohn. However, in Weinberger,
plaintiff was granted a hearing. It had submitted evidence
including a list of references, an unpublished study of the drug's
effect, a representative sample, and a testimonial letter. This
data was found sufficient evidence to require a hearing on
whether this constituted "substantial evidence." For the moment, then, a manufacturer faced with an Upjohn or Weinberger
type of situation should carefully weigh the evidence it wishes
to submit to a court to have the court issue a mandate for an
administrative hearing before the regulation about to affect the
manufacturer goes into effect.
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